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work quickly, whereas others generate too much competition, thereby causing some servers to refuse to work
with the buyer. Nevertheless, the trade-off between efficiency and incentives need not exist: It is possible to
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Abstract
Any buyer that depends on suppliers for the delivery of a service or the
production of a make-to-order component should pay close attention to the
suppliers’ service or delivery lead times. This paper studies a queuing model
in which two strategic servers choose their capacities/processing rates and
faster service is costly. The buyer allocates demand to the servers based on
their performance; the faster a server works, the more demand the server is
allocated. The buyer’s objective is to minimize the average lead time re-
ceived from the servers. There are two important attributes to consider in
the design of an allocation policy: the degree to which the allocation policy
eﬀectively utilizes the servers’ capacities and the strength of the incentives
the allocation policy provides for the servers to work quickly. Previous re-
search suggests that there exists a tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and incentives,
i.e., in the choice between two allocation policies a buyer may prefer the less
eﬃcient one because it provides stronger incentives. We find considerable
variation in the performance of allocation policies: some intuitively rea-
sonable policies generate essentially no competition among servers to work
quickly whereas others generate too much competition, thereby causing some
servers to refuse to work with the buyer. Nevertheless, the trade-oﬀ between
eﬃciency and incentives need not exist: it is possible to design an allocation
policy that is eﬃcient and also induces the servers to work quickly. We
conclude that performance-based allocation can be an eﬀective procurement
strategy for a buyer as long as the buyer explicitly accounts for the servers’
strategic behavior.
Keywords: game theory, joining behavior, Nash equilibrium, procurement,
sourcing, supplier management.
Fast service is clearly important. Less obvious is how to go about obtaining fast service
from suppliers or service providers. One technique is to make servers compete by allocating
business to them based on their performance, i.e., the faster server is rewarded with a
greater share of demand. For example, Sun Microsystems maintains multiple memory chip
suppliers and allocates demand with a scorecard system: a score is periodically assigned to
each supplier that depends on a number of factors, delivery lead time among them, and a
supplier’s allocation of Sun’s business is increasing as they improve their score relative to
the other suppliers (Farlow, Schmidt, and Tsay 1996). GE Lighting and Air Products and
Chemicals also allocate demand towards better performing suppliers (Pyke and Johnson,
2003).
This paper studies, in the context of a stylized queueing model, the issue of how performance-
based demand allocation can induce competition among suppliers to obtain faster service or
delivery lead times. A precursor to this line of research is the extensive body of work on
queue-joining behavior, pioneered by Naor (1969). That literature focuses on the behav-
ior of strategic customers/jobs: e.g., whether or not to join a queue (e.g., Naor, 1969) or
which of several queues to join (Bell and Stidham, 1983). It is generally found that the
behavior of individual jobs creates externalities on other jobs (e.g., over congestion of the
faster server). (See Hassin and Haviv 2003 for a review of the queue joining literature with
strategic customers/jobs.) Those externalities do not occur in our setting because a single
buyer controls all of the jobs. Instead, we have strategic servers; servers that can regulate
how fast they work, and working faster is costly.
In our model the buyer pays a fixed amount for each job, so the buyer’s task is to choose
an allocation policy to minimize the average lead time to complete jobs. We study allocation
policies that can be classified into two groups, state-dependent policies (the allocation of a
job to a server depends on the servers’ current workload) and state-independent policies (the
allocation of a job does not depend on the number of jobs currently in the servers’ queues).
With non-strategic servers it is clear that a state-dependent policy can deliver faster lead
times than a state-independent policy because, in part, a state-independent policy risks
allocating jobs to busy servers while other servers remain idle, i.e., a state-dependent policy
can do a better job of pooling the servers’ capacities.1 However, are state-dependent policies
1 Pooling is not necessarily a good idea if servers have significantly diﬀerent capacities.
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better when the servers are strategic? Suppose a state-independent policy induces servers to
work more quickly than a state-dependent policy. Then the buyer may be better oﬀ with
a state-independent policy even though the system’s capacity is not as eﬀectively utilized.
In other words, incentives may trump eﬃciency. In fact, Gilbert and Weng (1998) arrive
at that conclusion. Nevertheless, there are several reasons why this might not be the best
conclusion. First, we show that there is an error in their equilibrium existence proof, so
it is not always meaningful to compare their two allocation policies. Second, and more
importantly, they do not compare optimal policies. We compare the buyer’s best state-
dependent policy with the buyer’s best state-independent policy and find that the buyer
is better oﬀ with the state-dependent policy, i.e., the buyer can have both incentives and
eﬃciency. In general, we find that there is considerable variation in the performance of
intuitively reasonable policies. For example, the buyer’s optimal state-independent policy
with non-strategic servers is found to perform poorly in the presence of strategic servers,
and proportional allocation, which is probably the most intuitive allocation policy, can be
the worst performer of the policies we consider.
The next section describes our model in detail. Section 2 expands upon the related
literature. Section 3 studies the buyer’s allocation policy choice and the competition between
servers under several diﬀerent allocation policies. Section 4 discusses several extensions to
the model. The final section concludes with a summary of our results.
1 The model
A buyer procures a good (e.g., a make-to-order component, as in the Sun Microsystems
example) or a service. For ease of exposition, we assume a service is procured. There
are two servers. (Most of our results extend to more than two servers; see Zhang 2004 for
details.) Demand for the service arrives according to a Poisson process with rate λ. Each
demand is referred to as a job and all jobs are eventually completed. Server i’s average
service rate is μi and service times are exponentially distributed. We refer to μi as server i’s
capacity and μ = (μ1, μ2) denotes the capacity vector. A server with capacity μi incurs a
Rubinowitch (1985a) characterizes the conditions under which a job should never be
allocated to the slow server in a two-server queueing system.
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capacity cost at rate c(μi), no matter whether the capacity is utilized or idle, where c(0) = 0,
c0(·) > 0 and c00(·) ≥ 0 are assumed. The servers’ variable cost per job is normalized to zero.
We say that a job is allocated to a server when it is certain that server will complete the
job. The buyer pays R per allocated job. We assume R > r1, where
r1 = c(λ/2)/(λ/2),
because it is the minimal requirement for the suppliers to earn a non-negative profit and
deliver finite lead times (see Zhang 2004). We assume R is exogenous: there could be an
industry standard price that the buyer is unable to negotiate away from, or the price could
be set via negotiations that involve issues beyond the scope of this model.
The buyer controls her allocation policy (i.e., how jobs are allocated to servers) and the
servers choose their capacities. The buyer seeks to minimize the average delivery lead time
over an infinite horizon subject to the constraint that each server earns a non-negative profit,
and the servers seek to maximize their average profit:
πi(μ) = Rλi(μ)− c(μi), (1)
where λi(μ) is the rate server i is allocated jobs.2 Hence, we assume the buyer and the
servers do not discount future cash flows and they expect a long term relationship. We
focus on equilibria in which the servers adopt open-loop strategies, i.e., strategies that are
independent of the history of play. As a result, this infinite horizon capacity game among
servers can be analyzed as a single decision capacity game. Previous research on strategic
servers also restricts attention to open-loop strategies. In Section 3.3 we discuss lead-time
based allocation rather than capacity-based allocation.
2 Literature review
Kalai, Kamien, and Rubinovitch (1992) were the first to study strategic servers, but they
2 Note that servers are paid for allocated jobs rather than completed jobs. If they were
paid for completed jobs then their profit function would be πi(μ) = Rmin{μi, λi(μ)} −
c(μi). The equilibrium analysis of this profit function is significantly more complex due to
the kink created by the min function. Nevertheless, our qualitative results are not
diﬀerent. See Zhang (2004) for details.
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only consider a simple state-dependent policy in which jobs are allocated to idle servers with
equal probability. Gilbert and Weng (1998) expand upon their model to include a state-
independent allocation policy that allocates jobs to servers immediately upon arrival. They
conclude that a state-independent policy can be better for the buyer than a state-dependent
policy. Our results are diﬀerent, as we explain in detail in the subsequent sections. Christ
and Avi-Itzhak (2002) extend those models to include customer balking, but we do not have
balking.
Ha, Li, and Ng (2003) study the competition between two suppliers serving one buyer in
which delivery frequency is an element of the buyer’s allocation decision. But they study
deterministic demand, so, although they consider similar issues to ours, a direct comparison
between their work and ours is not meaningful.
There are papers that compare sole-sourcing versus dual sourcing, whereas we assume a
dual-sourcing strategy has been adopted: e.g., Anton and Yao (1989, 1992), Anupindi and
Akella (1993), Benjaafar, Elahi, and Donohue (2004), Seshadri (1995), Seshadri, Chatterjee,
and Lilien (1991). See Minner (2003) and Elmaghraby (2000) for reviews of the literature
on sourcing strategies.
There are papers that study a buyer’s procurement policy when there are multiple sup-
pliers with exogenously determined characteristics: e.g., Bonser and Wu (2001), Chen, Yao
and Zheng (2001), Li and Kouvelis (1999), Martinez de Albeniz and Simchi-Levi (2003),
Sedarage, Fujiwara, and Luong (1999), and Talluri (2002). In our model the servers’ lead
times depend on their choices and the buyer’s allocation policy.
Several papers study coordination and competition in supply chains with multiple suppli-
ers: Bernstein and DeCroix (2004); Wang and Gerchak (2003); and Nagarajan and Bassok
(2003). In these papers limited capacity leads to demand truncation rather than slower
delivery times. Bernstein and de Vericourt (2005) consider a market with multiple suppliers
and multiple buyers. Their suppliers have fixed processing rates and compete by oﬀering
diﬀerent lead times to buyers which they obtain via holding inventory.
There are a number of papers that study server competition in which firms choose oper-
ational strategies to adjust their delivery times: e.g., Allon and Federgruen (2003), Cachon
and Harker (2002), Chayet and Hopp (2002), Lederer and Li (1997) and So (2000). In
those papers the structure of how firms compete is exogenous, whereas in our model it is
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determined by the buyer via her allocation policy.
There is literature on capacity allocation (e.g., Cachon and Lariviere 1999a, 1999b, 1999c
and Deshpande and Schwarz 2002) in which a single manufacturer allocates scarce capacity
among multiple buyers. Although similar allocation policies are implemented to ours, those
models are analytically quite diﬀerent.
Li (1992) and Armony and Plambeck (2005) study models in which a buyer submits
duplicate orders to multiple suppliers. In our model each job is allocated to a single server,
but we briefly discuss order duplication in section 4.
3 Allocation and the servers’ capacity game
Our model can be analyzed in two inter-dependent parts. The first part is the buyer’s
allocation policy choice, i.e., how will the buyer allocate jobs among the two servers. The
second part is the capacity choice game played between the servers, which clearly depends
on the particular allocation policy the buyer has selected. Furthermore, the attractiveness
of an allocation policy to the buyer depends on the capacities chosen by the servers as well
as how jobs are routed through the system. We treat these two parts sequentially.
The set of allocation policies can be divided into two broad classes: state-independent
policies and state-dependent policies. With a state-independent policy the buyer allocates
jobs to servers based only on their capacities (which are inferred from past allocations and
resulting delivery times) and not on the current state of the system (e.g., how many jobs
are allocated to each server, which server is idle, etc.) Because no current information is
utilized with a state-independent policy, the buyer immediately allocates a job to a server
upon its arrival, i.e., there is no benefit to wait to allocate a job if waiting does not change
the allocation decision process. In contrast, with a state-dependent allocation policy the
buyer allocates jobs based on the current state of the system. For example, the buyer may
choose to allocate jobs only to idle servers.
Given a fixed capacity vector, the buyer’s optimal state-dependent policy is clearly never
worse (and can be strictly better) than the buyer’s optimal state-independent policy because
state-independent policies are a subset of the set of state-dependent policies. To be more
specific, assume both servers choose capacity μi so that it is optimal for the buyer to allocate
half of the jobs to each server. The optimal state-dependent policy allocates jobs only to idle
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servers and so the average lead time, Wsd(μi), is equivalent to an M/M/2 queueing system,
Wsd(μi) =
μi
μ2i − (λ/2)2
.
The optimal state-independent policy allocates jobs upon arrival to servers with equal prob-
ability, which yields an average lead time,Wsi(μi), that is equivalent to twoM/M/1 systems,
Wsi(μi) =
1
μi − λ/2
.
Assuming stable systems, μi > λ/2, it is intuitive that the state-dependent lead time is faster
than the state-independent lead time,Wsd(μi) < Wsi(μi), because the state-dependent policy
does a better job of pooling the servers’ capacities: with the state-dependent policy a job is
never waiting while there is an idle server, but that ineﬃcient outcome can occur with the
state-independent policy.
In addition to how jobs are routed through the system, the buyer’s lead time depends on
the capacities chosen by the servers. Again assuming the servers choose identical capacities,
it is easy to see that both Wsd(μi) and Wsi(μi) are decreasing in μi, i.e., the buyer’s lead
time with either type of allocation is reduced as the servers work faster. Because working
faster is costly to the servers, there exists a maximum rate, μ¯, at which the servers earn zero
profit given that they are allocated half of the jobs, i.e., μ¯ is the solution to c(μ¯) = Rλ/2.
From the buyer’s perspective, the ideal state-dependent allocation policy induces the servers
to choose capacity μ¯ and routes jobs so that the resulting lead time is Wsd(μ¯). Similarly,
the ideal state-independent policy induces the servers to choose capacity μ¯ and routes jobs
so that the lead time is Wsi(μ¯).3 It remains to be determined whether those ideals can be
achieved, i.e., does there exist an allocation policy that achieves μ¯ as an equilibrium outcome
3 We assume the buyer desires to have two symmetric servers. Given that the servers
have the same capacity cost function, it is either optimal for the system to have one
server that is allocated all jobs or two servers that are allocated half of the jobs, where the
latter is more likely as the capacity cost function becomes more convex. There could
be other reasons for maintaining multiple servers even if the capacity cost function suggests
one server would be optimal. We do not attempt to model those alternative reasons,
so we assume throughout that the buyer desires to dual-source and equally divide jobs
between the servers.
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of the servers’ capacity game? If so, then clearly the optimal state-dependent policy would
be strictly better for the buyer than the optimal state-independent policy.
3.1 State-independent allocation policies
Bell and Stidham (1983) identify the state-independent allocation policy, which we call Bell-
Stidham allocation, that minimizes the buyer’s lead time for any fixed capacity vector, μ :
λi(μ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
μi −
Ã
μ1/2i /
nˆP
j=1
μ1/2j
!Ã
nˆP
j=1
μj − λ
!
for i ≤ nˆ
0 for i > nˆ,
(2)
where the servers’ capacities are sorted in decreasing order and nˆ ≤ 2 is the largest integer
such that λnˆ (μ) ≥ 0.4 This allocation rule equates the marginal change in the average
number of jobs at each queue with respect to the arrival rate. Naturally, Bell-Stidham
allocation assigns half of the jobs to each server when the servers have the same capacity,
μbs, thereby achieving the lead time Wsi(μbs).
Bell-Stidham allocation was designed for non-strategic servers. With strategic servers,
according to Theorem 1, a symmetric equilibrium exists in this capacity game only under cer-
tain conditions. The capacity cost function restriction is relatively mild, but the restrictions
on R are significant. (All proofs are in the appendix.)
Theorem 1 With Bell-Stidham allocation, (2), if R > r2 = 2c0(λ/2), c000(μi) ≥ 0, and
πi(μbs) ≥ 0, where μbs is the unique solution toµ
R
4
¶µ
1 +
λ/2
μbs
¶
− c0(μbs) = 0, (3)
then μi = μbs > λ/2 is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.
An equilibrium (with finite lead times) may fail to exist with Bell-Stidham allocation
because the buyer’s price may be too low, R ≤ r2 : the servers do not feel the need to build
enough capacity to provide a stable system (i.e., they prefer to work at 100% utilization
than to compete for additional demand by working more quickly and operating at less than
4 They also provide results for M/G/1 queues and allow waiting time costs to vary
across queues. In this application the waiting time cost is naturally the same across
all queues. We discuss in Section 4 our results with non-exponential service times.
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100% utilization). (Note, because c(·) is convex, it is straightforward to show that r1 < r2.)
Alternatively, an equilibrium may fail to exist because the buyer pays too much, thereby
causing so much competition between the servers that they both cannot earn a positive
profit.5 Furthermore, it is apparent from (3) that the servers may not choose in equilibrium
the buyer’s ideal capacity, i.e., μbs 6= μ¯ is possible.
Although Bell-Stidham allocation is optimal for the buyer for any given capacity vector, it
does not take into consideration the behavior of strategic servers, and, as a result, it does not
necessarily provide the correct incentives for servers to choose a desirable capacity vector.
With strategic servers it is important to recognize that the buyer’s allocation policy need not
be optimal for all capacity vectors (as is Bell-Stidham). The role of the allocation policy is
to establish incentives for the servers to converge to a particular capacity equilibrium that is
desirable for the buyer, ideally (μ¯, μ¯). As a result, it is worthwhile to consider other allocation
policies that achieve an equal division of jobs in equilibrium, as with Bell-Stidham, but
allocate jobs diﬀerently than Bell-Stidham for non—equilibrium/non-symmetric capacities.
Gilbert and Weng (1998) propose balanced allocation: with balanced allocation the buyer
attempts to equalize (i.e., balance) the servers’ lead times for all capacity vectors (and only
fails to do so if all jobs are allocated to one server because of a large disparity in their
processing rates):
λi(μ) =
(
λ λ+ μj ≤ μi¡
μi − 12
¡
μi + μj − λ
¢¢+
otherwise
. (4)
Theorem 2 With balanced allocation, if R ≥ r2 = 2c0(λ/2), c00(μi) > 0 and c0(μb) ≥
c(μb)/λ, where μb is the unique solution to c0(μb) = R/2, then {μb, μb} is the unique Nash
equilibrium and the servers’ average lead times are finite. Otherwise, there does not exist
an equilibrium with finite lead times.
As with Bell-Stidham allocation, balanced allocation leads to a symmetric equilibrium
but the two allocation policies need not result in the same capacity, μbs 6= μb, and balanced
allocation also generally results in less than the buyer’s desired capacity, μb ≤ μ¯. Further-
more, three conditions are needed for an equilibrium to exist with balanced allocation. First,
5 For example, with a quadratic capacity cost function it can be shown that there exists
an upper bound, r3, such that there does not exist an equilibrium with R > r3.
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balanced allocation requires that the buyer’s price is suﬃciently high, R ≥ r2, otherwise the
reward for working fast is insuﬃcient to provide an incentive to work. Second, the capacity
cost function must be strictly convex, c00(μi) > 0, which rules out the important case of
linear capacity costs. Gilbert and Weng (1998) correctly recognized those first two condi-
tions, but did not recognize the necessary third condition, c0(μb) ≥ c(μb)/λ, which requires
the servers to earn a non-negative profit in equilibrium (e.g., with a quadratic cost function
c(μi) = aμ2i + bμi, a > 0, this condition translates into R ≤ 2
³
2aλ+
p
b2 + 4a2λ2
´
). They
erred by believing each server’s profit function is globally concave. In fact, it is concave
and decreasing for μi ∈ [0, μj − λ] and concave for μi > μj − λ. Hence, each server’s global
optimum is either the maximum of the first concave range, μi = 0, or the maximum of the
second concave range, μi > μj − λ. As a result, each server’s reaction function (the optimal
capacity given the capacity of the other server) harbors a discontinuity, which creates the
possibility of no equilibrium. However, if an equilibrium exists, then Gilbert and Weng
(1998) correctly identify the equilibrium.
An alternative allocation policy is needed that can be parameterized so as to adjust up
or down as needed the level of competition between the servers. We oﬀer two such policies:
linear allocation and proportional allocation. With linear allocation,
λi(μ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
θμρi − 1nˆ
Ã
θ
nˆP
j=1
μρj − λ
!
for i ≤ nˆ
0 for i > nˆ,
(5)
where the servers’ capacities are sorted in decreasing order, θ > 0, 0 < ρ ≤ 1 and nˆ ≤ 2 is the
largest integer such that λnˆ ≥ 0 and μnˆ > 0. A server does not necessarily receive a positive
allocation even if the server builds some capacity, but a server surely receives no allocation
if the server builds no capacity. If θ = 1 and ρ = 1 then linear allocation is almost identical
to balanced allocation: the only exception is the additional μnˆ > 0 requirement to receive
a positive allocation. (That reasonable requirement facilitates the uniqueness equilibrium
proof.) Hence, linear allocation can be considered a generalization of balanced allocation.
The parameters θ and ρ could potentially enable linear allocation to achieve many diﬀerent
capacity vectors as an equilibrium to the servers’ capacity game. But as already discussed,
the buyer’s desired outcome from the servers’ capacity game is (μ¯, μ¯) with an even division
of jobs between the servers. According to the next theorem, linear allocation can achieve
that objective. Hence, linear allocation is an optimal state-independent allocation policy.
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Theorem 3 Given linear allocation:
i. If c00(μi) > 0 , θ = 2c0(μl)/R and ρ = 1 then μi = μl = μ¯ for all i is a unique Nash
equilibrium and the average lead times are finite.
ii. If c(μi) = bμi (b > 0), θ = 4μ
1/2
l c
0(μl)/R and ρ = 1/2, then μi = μl = μ¯ for all i is the
unique Nash equilibrium and the average lead times are finite.
The parameters provided in Theorem 3 are not the only ones that achieve our objective
(that (μ¯, μ¯) is the unique Nash equilibrium), so we choose intuitive values for ρ : with strictly
convex capacity cost the ρ parameter is not necessary (hence, set to ρ = 1), but with a linear
capacity cost ρ < 1 is necessary to create an interior optimum for each server.
Proportional allocation is another policy that can be parameterized to adjust the level of
competition between the servers. With proportional allocation server i’s share of the buyer’s
jobs is
λi(μ) =
Ã
μβi
μβ1 + μ
β
2
!
λ (6)
where β ≥ 1 is a parameter. In particular, increasing β raises the intensity of competition,
thereby allowing the buyer to achieve the desired capacity vector, (μ¯, μ¯). Hence, proportional
allocation can also be an optimal state-independent allocation policy. However, because the
servers’ profit functions are not necessarily well behaved as β is increased, Theorem 4 provides
results only for a quadratic capacity cost function.
Theorem 4 Given proportional allocation and a quadratic capacity cost function c(μi) =
aμ2i + bμi, a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, a+ b > 0, if
β =
2μ¯c0(μ¯)
c(μ¯)
,
where c(μ¯) = Rλ/2 (i.e., μ¯ is the server’s break-even capacity), and R > r1 = c(λ/2)/(λ/2),
then μi = μ¯ for all i is the unique Nash equilibrium and average lead times are finite.
Although β > 1 is desirable for the buyer, it is worthwhile to mention that β = 1
yields an intuitively appealing allocation mechanism: with β = 1 a server’s demand share
equals the server’s share of total capacity and the servers’ utilizations are equated (i.e., each
server has the same number of jobs on average) Recall, Bell-Stidham allocation equates the
marginal change in the number of jobs at each server with respect to that server’s arrival
rate. However, existence of an equilibrium with β = 1 requires the buyer to pay a suﬃciently
large price and the servers’ capacities are less than ideal for the buyer, μp < μ¯.
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Theorem 5 With proportional allocation and β = 1, if R > r2 = 2c0(λ/2) then μi = μp for
all i is a unique Nash equilibrium with finite lead times, where μp is the unique solution to
c0(μp) =
µ
R
4
¶µ
λ
μp
¶
.
Otherwise, a Nash equilibrium does not exist with finite lead times.
3.2 State-dependent allocation
The simplest state-dependent policy is common-queue allocation, first studied by Kalai,
Kamien and Rubinovitch (1992): jobs are only allocated to idle servers, where each idle
server is equally likely to be allocated a job, and jobs are maintained on a queue if both
servers are occupied. For convenience, the following lemma repeats their results.
Lemma 6 Given c00(μi) > 0 and the buyer implements common-queue allocation, let μc be
the unique solution to
c0(μc) =
Rλ2
2μc(2μc + λ)
.
If R > r2 = 2c0(λ/2) then {μc, μc} is the unique Nash equilibrium in the capacity game and
the servers’ average lead times are finite. If R ≤ r2 then there does not exist an equilibrium
with finite lead times.
Common-queue allocation has the desirable feature that it pools the capacities of the
servers (there are never waiting jobs and idle servers at the same time). Hence, with non-
strategic and identical servers, common-queue is in fact optimal for the buyer. But an
equilibrium with finite lead times does not exist with common-queue allocation if the price
is too low, R ≤ r2. Furthermore, Gilbert and Weng (1998) demonstrate that with strategic
servers common-queue can be worse for the buyer than balanced allocation because it does
not provide suﬃcient incentives for the servers to work quickly. Hence, a state-dependent
allocation policy may actually perform worse than a state-independent policy.
Although common-queue is optimal for the buyer given symmetric capacities, it is not
optimal for the buyer with asymmetric capacities. Intuitively, if one server is much slower
than the other server, then the buyer may be better oﬀ allocating a job to the busy fast
server than to the idle slow server; e.g., a fast server may be able to complete two jobs faster
than the slow server can complete one job. This intuition suggests a threshold allocation
policy which is implemented as follows. One server is labeled the primary server and the
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other the secondary server. A single parameter, m ∈ {0, 1, 2...}, regulates how jobs are
allocated to the primary and secondary servers: allocate a job to the primary server if the
primary server is idle or if the primary server has fewer than m jobs in queue; allocate a job
to the secondary server only if the secondary server is idle, the primary server is busy and
has m jobs in queue. It is natural to think of the faster server as the primary server, but
the policy can also be implemented with the slower server designated as the primary.
Given non-strategic servers, Rubinovitch (1985b) provides a numerical method to evaluate
the system’s performance under threshold allocation and Lin and Kumar (1984) prove that
a threshold policy is the buyer’s optimal allocation with two servers, i.e., the average time
in the system for each unit is minimized. Additional proofs are available from Koole (1995)
and Walgrand (1984).
It is intuitive that as the threshold parameter, m, increases, the primary server’s share of
the buyer’s demand increases and the secondary server’s share decreases . Withm =∞ the
primary server earns the buyer’s entire demand while the secondary server is never allocated
a job. Hence, by varying which server is designated the primary and by randomizing
between diﬀerent m values, the buyer is able to allocate to the faster server any portion of
the buyer’s demand.6 As a result, it is possible to design a threshold policy in which server
i’s allocation exactly equals his allocation with linear allocation for any chosen capacities.
Servers only care about their share of the buyer’s jobs, not how that allocation is achieved
or the resulting lead time for the buyer. Therefore, if the described threshold policy is used,
the equilibrium in the capacity game is equivalent to the equilibrium with linear allocation.
Furthermore, in equilibrium the servers have equal capacity, so the threshold ism = 0, i.e., in
equilibrium the servers build capacity as if linear allocation were implemented but the system
actually achieves the same lead time as common-queue allocation. Although the techniques
in Rubinovitch (1985b) allow for the evaluation of the proper thresholds, a threshold policy
is clearly not as simple to evaluate as the other allocation policies we discuss. But, in
theory, it provides in equilibrium the maximum capacity like linear allocation while also
providing the operational eﬃciency of common-queue allocation. Hence, it is an optimal
6 Even with m = 0, the faster server, when designated the primary, can earn more
than 50% of the buyer’s demand. Threshold allocation can assign less demand to the
faster server only if the faster server is designated the secondary server.
12
state-dependent policy for the buyer. We conclude that there need not exist a trade-oﬀ
between incentives and eﬃciency: the optimal state-dependent policy, threshold allocation,
performs better than the optimal state-independent policy, linear allocation.
Additional comparisons among the policies can be made via some graphical examples. For
each allocation policy, Figures 1 and 2 show the relationship between R and the equilibrium
lead times with two examples: c(μi) = 4μi and λ = 1; and c(μi) = 4μ2i and λ = 1. We see
from these figures that for a given price the buyer’s lead time can vary considerably. In all
cases common-queue and proportional allocation with β = 1 perform poorly. Bell-Stidham
allocation gives intermediate performance. Balanced allocation performs reasonably well
when an equilibrium exists, but an equilibrium exists for a relatively limited range of prices
(it never exists with linear capacity cost). Overall, threshold allocation is clearly the best,
but linear allocation, especially given its simplicity, is a good second choice.
The next lemma explores further the diﬀerence between linear and threshold allocation.
Lemma 7 Define z(R) = Wsd(μt(R))/Wsi(μl(R)), where μt(R) and μl(R) are the equilib-
rium capacities under threshold and linear allocations respectively when the price is R. Recall
that μt(R) = μl(R), i.e., for a fixed wholesale price threshold and linear allocation generate
the same capacity. The ratio z(R) is concave and increasing from 1/2 to 1.
The comparison between threshold and linear allocation is intuitive: if system utilization
is quite high, because R is low, then threshold allocation has a single queue with a large
number of jobs whereas linear allocation has two queues with a large number of jobs (i.e.,
threshold’s lead time is half of linear’s lead time); but if system utilization is quite low,
because R is high, then jobs never wait with either allocation policy. Although Lemma
7 indicates that linear allocation is significantly worse than threshold allocation when the
buyer’s price is low, this result is somewhat misleading. Suppose now that the buyer is able
to modify her price somewhat. Let Rt be the price with threshold allocation and let Rl
be the price with linear allocation and choose these prices such that they lead to the same
delivery lead time, Wsd(μt(Rt)) =Wsi(μl(Rl)). According to the next lemma, if Rt is either
low or high, then there is a small price premium needed with linear allocation to achieve the
same lead time.
Lemma 8 Let ρ be the system’s utilization in equilibrium. Rl/Rt → 1 as either ρ→ 1 or
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ρ→ 0.
3.3 Lead-time based allocation
This section considers whether the buyer could do better (or at least as well) with an allo-
cation policy based on the servers’ lead times rather than based on their capacities. In a
lead-time based allocation, the buyer announces the demand share function λi in terms of
servers’ lead time vector W = (W1,W2) > 0, the servers submit their bids on lead times,
demand shares are determined and each server i builds capacity μi(Wi, λi(W )) to fulfill its
lead-time bid, where μi is a decreasing function of Wi. Assume
λ1(W )− λ1(Wε) < μ1 (W1, λ1(W ))− μ1 (W1 + ε, λ1(Wε)) (7)
where Wε = (W1 + ε,W2) and ε > 0 : if server one promises a longer lead time then server
one’s required capacity to achieve that lead time decreases more than server one’s demand
allocation. The analogous assumption is taken for the other server as well. This assumption
holds, for example, when each server operates an M/M/1 queue, in which case
μi(Wi, λi(W )) = 1/Wi + λi (W ) . (8)
Lead-time based allocation is analytically cleaner than capacity-based allocation because
there is no issue with the stability of the queues: by definition, the buyer’s lead time is
positive and finite for any strategic choice vector of the servers, whereas with capacity-based
allocation the servers may fail to choose a suﬃcient capacity to yield a finite lead time for
the buyer. However, according to the next lemma, analytical tractability can come with a
price.
Lemma 9 Consider any continuous lead-time allocation with λi decreasing inWi. If (W1,W2)
is a Nash equilibrium with corresponding demand shares (λ1, λ2) and μi(Wi, λi(W )) satisfies
(7) , then μi(Wi, λi(W )) ≤ μˆ for all i, where μˆ is the solution to c0(μˆ) = R. (If c(μ) is linear,
let μˆ =∞).
Recall that μ¯ is the servers’ maximum capacity (i.e., c(μ¯) = Rλ/2) and the capacity
achieved with linear or threshold allocation based on capacities. It is possible that the
maximum achievable capacity with a lead-time based allocation policy, μˆ, is less than the
maximum with a capacity based allocation policy, μ¯.We demonstrate this with two examples
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in which the relationship between a server’s lead time and its capacity is given by (8), i.e., a
state-independent allocation policy is implemented. First, suppose the capacity cost function
is quadratic, c(μ) = aμ2 + bμ and a > 0. Then μ¯ > μˆ for all R ∈ (r1, aλ+
√
b2 + a2λ), i.e.,
for suﬃciently small R in the feasible range (R > r1) the buyer cannot design a continuous
allocation policy based on the servers’ lead times that achieves the maximum capacity, μ¯.
Next suppose c(μ) = aμγ for a > 0 and γ > 1. In this case,
μ¯
μˆ
=
¡
Rλ
2a
¢ 1
γ³
R
γa
´ 1
γ−1
=
µ
γ
³r1
R
´ 1
γ
¶ 1
γ−1
,
where recall that r1 = c(λ/2)/(λ/2) = a (λ/2)
γ−1 . It follows that μ¯ > μˆ when R ∈ (r1, r1γγ),
i.e., lead-time based allocation is likely to be inferior to capacity based allocation as the
buyer’s price is low and as the capacity cost function becomes more convex (γ increases).
Despite the one-to-one relationship between a server’s lead time and the server’s capacity
for a fixed allocation, lead-time based allocation may not be as eﬀective as capacity-based
allocation because lead-time based allocation has a self-restraining property that dampens
competition among the servers: committing to a higher service level requires more investment
than committing to a higher capacity. A similar result is obtained in Cachon and Zipkin
(1999) in the context of inventory management in a serial supply chain with two independent
firms: with non-strategic firms the optimal policy can be implemented as either a set of
installation base stock policies or as a set of echelon base stock policies (briefly, these policies
diﬀer in what information they use) but with strategic firms these two approaches yield
diﬀerent equilibrium results.
4 Discussion
This section discusses several modeling issues. Although we assume exponential processing
times, some of our results extend to more general processing time distributions. As in Bell
and Stidham (1983), suppose μ is the service rate and the service time S has first moment
E(S) = 1/μ and second moment E(S2) = bμ−2. The variance is then (b − 1)μ−2 and the
coeﬃcient of variation is constant, (b− 1)1/2. For an M/G/1 queue with the above service
time distribution, the average lead time (duration in the system) is
W (λ) =
1
μ
+
bλ
2μ(μ− λ) .
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Balanced, linear, proportional, Bell-Stidham and threshold allocations readily extend to this
general distribution because demand is allocated based only on the servers’ capacities and
not on their lead times. However, the extension is not straightforward for common-queue
because then the servers’ shares of demand are endogenously determined.
Throughout our analysis we have assumed that each job is processed by only one server.
In practice there are examples in which firms duplicate their orders across multiple suppliers
or servers (see Armony and Plambeck 2005, Li 1992 and Yoﬃe 1990). If order duplication
is feasible then it is ideal from the point of view of system eﬃciency: even if there is only
one job in the system all servers are working at their full rate. However, as we have
demonstrated, it is also important for an allocation policy to provide suﬃcient incentives for
strategic servers to work hard. Zhang (2004) demonstrates that order duplication performs
poorly on incentives, so poorly that its overall performance tends to be worse than linear
allocation. Hence, even if operating conditions are ideal for order duplication, a buyer
should avoid order duplication.
We use demand allocation as the motivator to provide fast service, but other motivators
may exist. For example, if the buyer has some control over the price, R, then raising the
price, as we see in Figures 1 and 2, generates faster service (but with some allocation policies
it also eliminates the existence of an equilibrium). The buyer could make a trade-oﬀ between
the higher price paid and the faster service received. Nevertheless, unless the price paid
is extremely high, there remains considerable variation in the performance of the allocation
policies.
Instead of allocating demand, the buyer could try to motivate faster service by posting a
payment schedule that is contingent on the servers’ capacities or lead times. For example,
suppose the buyer wants each server to build μ∗i > λ/2 capacity. This is achievable with
the following price schedule, R(μi),
R00(μi) < 0, R
0(μ∗i )(λ/2) = c
0(μ∗i ) and R(μ
∗
i ) (λ/2) = c(μ
∗
i ) :
the first condition ensures a unique μi maximizes the server’s profit, the second condition
ensures that μ∗i is optimal for the server and the third condition makes the server’s profit
condition binding. It is also possible that the R(μi) schedule could be implemented with a
fixed price and late fees because then the late fees paid are contingent on the chosen capacity.
(See Cachon and Zhang 2006 for a similar model with sole sourcing and late fees.) Our
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model does not address whether demand allocation is preferable to these or other contracting
methods. However, we point out that these contracting methods require the buyer to posses
significant bargaining power over the servers — the buyer must be able to control the pricing
schedule used and its parameters, whereas demand allocation can be implemented by the
buyer even if the buyer has little bargaining power. Therefore, because allocation policies
are simple to implement and observed in practice, we suspect they are desirable vis-a-vis
other techniques along at least some dimensions. Overall, additional research is needed to
identify the situations in which demand allocation is the best option for the buyer.
In our analysis we assume the suppliers have identical cost functions, which is reasonable in
markets that have homogeneous technologies. This naturally leads to symmetric equilibria.
With heterogenous cost functions, equilibrium analysis is more challenging. Zhang (2004)
provides some initial results and finds that existence is less likely as costs become more
heterogeneous: as one supplier gains a cost advantage it becomes necessary to dampen the
competition among the suppliers to prevent one supplier from driving the other supplier out
of the market, just like the problem we see when R is too high in the symmetric cost case.
Hence, performance based allocation of demand appears to be most eﬀective when suppliers
have comparable costs.
Our model assumes that each supplier only serves the buyer, as in the case when a supplier
builds or reserves dedicated capacity for the buyer. In some cases each supplier may cater
to multiple buyers, thereby creating two strategic decisions for each supplier: how much
capacity to build and how to prioritize that capacity across buyers. Furthermore, there may
be diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent priorities. The analysis of these systems is clearly beyond
the scope of this research, but we again suspect that the buyer could use a smartly designed
allocation policy to obtain higher priority from suppliers.
We conduct our analysis in the context of a queuing system, but there are also situations
that may be better modeled as an inventory system: e.g., each supplier could choose a base
stock policy and the buyer is concerned with some dimension of the supplier’s delivery lead
time distribution. While the specifics of the analysis would diﬀer, we suspect that demand
allocation would again be a useful tool for the buyer to motivate for better reliability among
her suppliers.
Our analysis is conducted exclusively in steady state. For example, we assume that the
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buyer is able to infer each server’s capacity from the servers’ delivery times so that the correct
demand share can be implemented. In practice the buyer would only obtain an estimate of
each server’s capacity. The significance of sampling error on our results is an open question.
Finally, we have implicitly assumed that the buyer is able to credibly commit to implement
the chosen allocation policy. Without that ability, the buyer’s set of allocation policies to
choose from is quite limited. For example, if the buyer must implement a state-independent
policy, then only Bell-Stidham allocation is credible because it minimizes the buyer’s waiting
time for any set of capacities chosen. If the buyer implements a state-dependent policy,
then only threshold allocation is credible, but not necessarily the same threshold policy
discussed in Section 3.2: again, the threshold policy must be chosen so as to minimize the
buyer’s waiting time for any capacity vector. Hence, the ability to credibly commit to an
allocation policy is important to the buyer. We note that this same issue occurs in many
other settings. For example, in the supply chain contracting literature, many coordinating
contracts are studied and observed that require commitments: a buy-back contract is an a
priori commitment by a supplier to pay a retailer for units returned by the retailer after
stochastic demand occurs even though the supplier has no ex post incentive to do so.
5 Conclusion
In this paper two queuing servers strategically choose their capacities/processing rates in
response to a buyer’s demand allocation policy. The buyer’s objective is to design the
allocation policy to achieve the shortest possible average delivery time from the servers, either
by motivating the servers to build more capacity or by ensuring that the available capacity is
eﬀectively utilized. We focus on allocation policies based on the servers’ capacities because
we show that lead-time based allocation policies may not perform as well.
Previous research suggests that there may exist a trade-oﬀ between incentives and eﬃ-
ciency: an allocation policy that eﬃciently utilizes the servers’ capacity may provide weak
incentives for them to work quickly and an allocation policy with strong incentives to work
quickly may not eﬀectively utilize the servers’ capacity. We indeed demonstrate that there
is considerable variation in the performance across allocation policies. Many allocation poli-
cies either provide absolutely no incentive for the servers to deliver quickly or provide too
much competition among servers, thereby leading to unpredictable behavior. Even policies
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that are optimal for the buyer with non-strategic and symmetric servers can perform poorly
with strategic servers. However, we show that there need not be a trade-oﬀ between incen-
tives and eﬃciency, i.e., there exists an allocation policy, threshold allocation, that induces
the servers to work at their maximum rate and minimizes the buyer’s lead time given the
resulting capacities.
Unfortunately, threshold allocation is complex. For example, its optimal parameters
cannot be determined in closed form. We oﬀer linear allocation as an alternative. Linear
allocation also induces the servers to work at the maximum possible rate, but linear allocation
does not utilize the servers’ capacity as eﬀectively as threshold allocation. In particular,
because linear allocation allocates jobs immediately upon arrival and the assignment of jobs
does not depend on the current state of the system (it is a state-independent allocation
policy), linear allocation may allocate a job to a busy server while the other server is idle.
Nevertheless, we show that linear and threshold allocations converge in performance at high
utilizations, which suggests that linear allocation is attractive along many dimensions.
To conclude, a buyer should not ignore demand allocation as a strategy to obtain faster
service, especially given its simplicity: there is no need to negotiate new contract terms or
pricing with the servers because demand allocation can be implemented by a buyer without
the explicit consent of the servers. But creating competition among servers via their past
performance requires some sophistication; a haphazard application of this strategy could
have little impact.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Server i’s profit function is πi(μi) = Rλi−c(μi). Let μ0i be defined such
that μ0i > 0 and λi(μ0i ) = 0 or μ0i = 0. πi(μi) is then concave and decreasing for μi ∈ [0, μ0i ].
Now diﬀerentiate πi,
∂πi(μi)
∂μi
= R
⎛
⎜⎝1− μ
1/2
iP
μ1/2j
−
¡P
μj − λ
¢
μ1/2j
2μ1/2i
³P
μ1/2j
´2
⎞
⎟⎠− c0(μi)
and, for notational convenience, let B = μj − λ,
∂2πi(μi)
∂μ2i
=
Rμ1/2j
4(
P
μ1/2j )3
(μ1/2j Bμ
−3/2
i + 3Bμ
−1
i − 3μ
1/2
j μ
−1/2
i − 1)− c00(μi).
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Define f(μi) = Bμ
1/2
j μ
−3/2
i + 3Bμ
−1
i − 3μ
1/2
j μ
−1/2
i − 1. If B ≤ 0, then π00i (μi) ≤ 0 and
πi(μi) is concave. Otherwise it can be shown that df/dμi = 0 has only one positive solution.
Moreover, f →∞ and df/dμi < 0 as μi → 0 and f < 0 as μi →∞. Thus f decreases from
the positive domain to the negative domain. Since c000(μi) ≥ 0, there exists a μ1i ≥ μ0i such
that πi(μi) is concave and decreasing for μi ∈ [0, μ0i ], convex for μi ∈ [μ0i , μ1i ] and concave
for μ1i < μi. Because πi(0) = 0, it follows that any interior solution to server i’s first-order
condition is a global optimum if at that solution profit is non-negative.
The following equation provides the unique solution to the first-order conditions given the
constraint μi = μj: µ
R
4
¶µ
1 +
λ/2
μi
¶
− c0(μi) = 0.
(Because c(μi) is convex, the left hand side is decreasing, so there is a unique solution.) The
lower bound on R ensures that μbs > λ/2. The condition πi(μbs) ≥ 0 ensures that μbs is
indeed a global optimum for all servers.¤
Proof of Theorem 2: There are two significant complications to this analysis which prevent
the use of standard existence and uniqueness results. (1) πi is not unimodal (if μ2 > λ,
then π1 is concave and decreasing for μ1 ∈ [0, μ2 − λ] and concave for μ1 > μ2 − λ, but not
globally concave), which may create a discontinuity in the servers’ best reply functions. (2)
πi is not diﬀerentiable at μi = λ − μj, which prevents the unconditional use of first-order
conditions to determine the global maximizer of πi. Let’s first establish when {μb, μb} is a
Nash equilibrium under the given conditions. The servers’ first-order conditions are satisfied
when c0(μb) = R/2, which yields a finite lead time only if μb > λ/2, which simplifies to the
first condition. But because μi = 0 can be optimal for a server, μb is an optimal response
only if πi(μb, μb) ≥ 0, i.e., if Rλ/2 ≥ c(μb), which can be written as c0(μb) ≥ c(μb)/λ (the
second condition). Now let’s rule out other equilibria. Suppose {μi, μj} is an equilibrium,
μi ≥ μj. Several cases need to be considered. (i) μi ≥ λ+ μj. If μj > 0, then server j earns
a negative profit, so this is not an equilibrium. If μj = 0, then it must be that μi = λ. For
server j we have πj(λ, μb) = c0(μb)μb− c(μb) > 0, breaking the equilibrium. (ii) μi+μj < λ
which implies μj < λ/2. From server j’s first-order condition we get c0(μj) = R > 2c0(λ/2),
which implies μj > λ/2 because c0(·) is increasing. Hence, we have a contradiction, so no
equilibrium. (iii) μi + μj = λ. For this to be optimal for both servers it must be that
R ≤ 2c0(μi) and R ≤ 2c0(μj), which cannot both be satisfied because R > 2c0(λ/2). (iv)
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μi+μj > λ and μi < λ+μj. Now the only solution to the first-order conditions is {μb, μb}.
To obtain an equilibrium with finite lead times, we need μi + μj > λ. Since μi ≥ λ+ μj
cannot be an equilibrium, there must be μi < λ+μj, which implies that {μb, μb} is the only
solution to the first-order conditions. But {μb, μb} is not an equilibrium if c0(μb) < c(μb)/λ
and μb < λ/2 if R < r2.¤
Proof of Theorem 3. (i) For Nash equilibrium we need to show that μl maximizes server i’s
profit if the other server chooses μj = μl. The primary complication is due to the revenue
term, Rλi(μ), in the profit function. Server i’s allocation is
λi(μ) = min
©
(θμi/2− θμl/2 + λ/2)+ , λ
ª
= min
(µ
θμi/2−
λ
2
µ
c0(μl)μl
c(μl)
− 1
¶¶+
, λ
)
The second term is negative. So there exists some μ0i such that λi = 0 for all μi ≤ μ0i . If
μi = μl then λi(μ) = λ/2. The condition R > r1 ensures that λ/2 < μl, so it follows that
μ0i < μl. The server’s profit function is concave and decreasing for μi ≤ μ0i and concave and
continuous for μi > μ0i , although possibly not diﬀerentiable when λi(μ) = λ. For μi > μ0i ,
by construction of the parameters, πi is maximized with μi = μl and πi = 0 with μi = μl.
Therefore, μl is optimal for server i. Lead times are finite because μl > λ/2. Next we
concentrate on uniqueness.
Suppose μ is a Nash equilibrium of the capacity game. The proof first rules out asymmetric
equilibrium with positive capacity for all servers and then equilibrium with μi = 0 for some
i are ruled out.
Suppose in some equilibrium μi > 0 for all i. It must be then that λi > 0 for all i
(otherwise server i would make negative profit). Thus, the first-order condition for each
server must be satisfied given nˆ = 2, but that yields μi = μl for all i because the solution to
each server’s first-order condition depends only on μi.
Now suppose there exists a μi = 0 in equilibrium. All servers choosing μi = 0 cannot
be an equilibrium because then one server could build a small amount of capacity and earn
positive profit. If server 1 has the only positive capacity, then server 1 receives λ1(μ) = λ
as long as μ1 > 0; this cannot be an equilibrium because then server 1’s optimal capacity is
some arbitrarily small capacity, which then allows the other server to build positive capacity
and earn positive profit. (The condition μi > 0 for all i ≤ nˆ in the allocation function is
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critical to this result.)
(ii) The proof is similar to (i), so it is omitted.¤
Proof of Theorem 4. For server i
∂πi(μ)
∂μi
= Rλβ
μβ−1i μ
β
j
(
P
j μ
β
j )
2
− (2aμi + b), i = 1, 2.
Given R and β, simple algebra reveals that μi = μp is a symmetric solution to the first order
conditions and it is the only solution. If each server chooses μp, then each server earns a
zero profit. So it is an equilibrium if maxπi = 0. Diﬀerentiate:
∂2πi(μ)
∂μ2i
= Rλβ
μβ−2i μ
β
j³
μβi + μ
β
j
´3 h(β − 1)μβj − (β + 1)μβi i− 2a.
Note that β = 2μ¯c0(μ¯)/c(μ¯) > 2. It can be shown (see Zhang 2004 for details) that πi is
concave-convex-concave if μj = μp. Because πi = 0 and π0i < 0 when μi = 0, it must be that
maxπi = 0. Therefore, μ1 = μ2 = μp is the unique Nash equilibrium of the capacity game.¤
Proof of Theorem 5. First demonstrate that μi = μp for all i is a unique Nash equilibrium
when R > r2. The first-order conditions must be satisfied:
∂πi(μ)
∂μi
= Rλ
μj
(
P
j μj)2
− c0(μi) = 0, i = 1, 2. (9)
The first-order conditions imply μi = μj, so the only solution must be μi = μp for all i.
The condition R > r2 ensures the solution to the first-order conditions has μi > λ/2, which
provides finite lead times. Now suppose R ≤ r2 and there is an equilibrium with finite lead
times. If the lead times are finite then the first-order conditions (9) hold and only μi = μj
satisfy them. Again, because lead times are finite, it must be that μi = μj > λ/2. Because
each first-order condition is increasing in R, each first-order condition is maximized with
R = r2, in which case (9) can be written as
c0(λ/2)λ/(2μi)− c0(μi) < 0
which means that μi = μj cannot be an equilibrium.¤
Proof of Lemma 6. See Kalai, Kamien, and Rubinovitch (1992).¤
Proof of Lemma 7. It is easy to determine that z(R) = μl/ (μl + λ/2) and the results follow
immediately given that μl ≥ λ/2.¤
Proof of Lemma 8. Each generates the maximum capacity, so c(μl) = Rl(λ/2) and c(μt) =
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Rt(λ/2), which imply Rl/Rt = c(μl)/c(μt). If waiting times are equivalent, then
μt
μ2t − (λ/2)2
=
1
μl − λ/2
which simplifies to μl/μt = 1− ρ2 + ρ.¤
Proof of Lemma 9. Server i’s profit is
πi(W ) = λi(W )R− c(μi (Wi, λi(W ))).
Let W be an equilibrium with μ1 (W1, λ1(W )) > μˆ. Define Wε = (W1 + ε,W2) and λε =
λ1(W )−λ1(Wε) : server 1 is allocated λε fewer units of demand because of the slower service
provided to the buyer. Next we show that there exists an ε > 0 that would increase server
1’s profit, which leads to a contradiction. The diﬀerence between the profit functions can be
written as
π1(W )− π1(Wε)
= λεR− [c(μ1 (W1, λ1(W )))− c(μ1 (W1 + ε, λ1(Wε)))].
We know that μ1 (W1, λ1(W )) > μˆ implies c0(μ1 (W1, λ1(W ))) > R. Since λ1 is continuous,
for a suﬃciently small ε, there is also c0(μ1 (W1 + ε, λ1(Wε))) > R. By assumption,
λε < μ1 (W1, λ1(W ))− μ1 (W1 + ε, λ1(Wε)) ,
i.e., the required capacity decreases more than demand when the server provides worse
service, we know that
λεR < c(μ1 (W1, λ1(W )))− c(μ1 (W1 + ε, λ1(Wε)))
or π1(W )− π1(Wε) < 0. Therefore, there exists an ε that would increase server 1’s profit.
As a result, W cannot be an equilibrium.¤
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Figure 1: The lead time received by the buyer as a function of the price paid, R, and the 
allocation policy with capacity cost ( ) 4i ic μ μ=  and λ = 1.  t = threshold policy, l = 
linear allocation, bs = Bell-Stidham, c = common queue, p = proportional allocation 
with β = 1. (Balanced allocation is not included because an equilibrium does not exist 
in this setting.)  
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Figure 2: The lead time received by the buyer as a function of the price paid, R, and the 
allocation policy with capacity cost 2( ) 4i ic μ μ=  and λ = 1.  t = threshold policy, l = 
linear allocation, b = balanced allocation, bs = Bell-Stidham, c = common queue, p = 
proportional allocation with β = 1. 
